University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Journalism and Media Faculty Publications

Journalism and Media

10-28-2022

Social Media and Contentious Action: The Use and Users of QQ
Groups in China
Zixue Tai
University of Kentucky, ztai2@uky.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jat_facpub
Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons, and the Journalism Studies
Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Repository Citation
Tai, Zixue, "Social Media and Contentious Action: The Use and Users of QQ Groups in China" (2022).
Journalism and Media Faculty Publications. 10.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jat_facpub/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journalism and Media at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journalism and Media Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Social Media and Contentious Action: The Use and Users of QQ Groups in China
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v10i4.5894

Notes/Citation Information
Published in Media and Communications, Protesting While Polarized: Digital Activism in Contentious
Times, v.10, no. 4.
© Zixue Tai. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits any use, distribution,
and reproduction of the work without further permission provided the original author(s) and source are
credited.

This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jat_facpub/10

Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2022, Volume 10, Issue 4, Pages 66–76
https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v10i4.5894
Article

Social Media and Contentious Action: The Use and Users of QQ Groups
in China
Zixue Tai
School of Journalism and Media, University of Kentucky, USA; ztai2@uky.edu
Submitted: 10 June 2022 | Accepted: 9 August 2022 | Published: 28 October 2022
Abstract
This article presents an analysis of a netnographic study of QQ groups engaged in contentious activities in China. Informed
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ics in the QQ groups point to a hybrid model of activist‐brokered networks, which crosscuts and interconnects elements
in Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) prototype of self‐organizing networks and organizationally brokered networks. Group
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1. Introduction
Social media have been a leading force of technological
innovation and social change in China in the new mil‐
lennium. Although popular platforms such as Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter are banned from Chinese virtual
territories, home‐grown technologies have made them‐
selves a ubiquitous presence in people’s everyday lives.
This research focuses on the role of QQ, an instant‐
messaging service developed by Tencent, in collective
contention. More specifically, our investigation pertains
to the use of QQ groups for mobilizing and coordinat‐
ing mass protests in China. After a review of relevant
literature in the context of social media use and col‐
lective action, the article reports the findings of our
years‐long ethnographic research coupled with in‐depth
interviews of four QQ user groups exclusively dedicated
to contentious action, with emphasis on administration
Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 4, Pages 66–76

of group interaction, organization mechanics, and mobi‐
lization strategies. Special attention is paid to how indi‐
vidual and collective circumstances shape group dynam‐
ics. In particular, the article draws attention to the emer‐
gence of a new type of organization mechanism as
enabled through activist‐brokered networks in empow‐
ering mass contention. Through the conceptual lens of
academic research in cross‐national settings, its discus‐
sion is grounded in the broad socio‐political and online
environment in China.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Mass Protest and Popular Contention in China
China boasts a long history of robust and oftentimes tur‐
bulent popular protest from ancient to contemporary
times (Perry, 2015). Economic reform and liberalization in
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recent decades have unshackled diverse patterns of con‐
flict and resentment embedded in convoluted sociopolit‐
ical and economic relationships. As a result, contentious
and transgressive activities ranging from property/land
rights to labor relations and environmental protection
have surged in the past three decades, transitioning
China into a “contentious authoritarianism” in which “a
strong authoritarian regime accommodates widespread
and routinized collective protests” (Chen, 2012, p. 189).
There are two countervailing approaches in the
Chinese authorities’ handling of contentious politics.
On the one hand, social stability has been acclaimed as a
hallmark achievement by the ruling Chinese Communist
Party, and weiwen (stability maintenance) has been a
top priority for the state autocracy (Scoggins, 2018).
Consequently, minimization of mass protests and pub‐
lic grievances (either through preemptive elimination
or peaceful resolution) has been an important bench‐
mark in awarding promotion to government officials
(Mirić & Pechenkina, 2022). On the other hand, there
is tolerance for and responsiveness to—albeit limited—
public dissent and protests of aggrieved citizens, and
the official measure may range from reconciliation to
co‐option and brutal suppression, depending on the
nature of the demands and issues at hand (Li, 2019). This
“power of instability” as a multipronged mechanism of
grievance management gives leverage to defuse conflict‐
ual state‐society relations into material and symbolic con‐
cessions for the parties involved (Lee & Zhang, 2013).
The tendency of the Chinese regime to constantly recon‐
solidate and reconstitute itself in the face of contesta‐
tions and hold on to power is summarized in the perspec‐
tives of “authoritarian resilience” (Sinkkonen, 2021) and
“responsive authoritarianism” (Marquis & Bird, 2018),
which argue that the authoritarian regime develops the
ability to adjust and adapt by allowing a degree of politi‐
cal participation and feedback on contentious issues.
2.2. Social Media and Connective Action
The mainstreaming of online networks in routine life
has fundamentally redefined the contours of collective
action and social movements (Treré, 2018). The latest
waves of social media innovation have pushed digital
activism to ever new territories and have expanded the
repertoire of formations in which dispersed individuals
and formal groups collaborate and coordinate efforts to
contemplate, mobilize, and organize contentious action
(Kavada & Poell, 2021; Margetts et al., 2015). As noted by
Bennett and Segerberg (2012), networked technologies
in the digital era have become pivotal to the mobiliza‐
tion and staging of collective action, and, consequently,
there has been a dramatic shift from the conventional
logic of collective action grounded in the organization‐
centered and leader‐driven mode of resource mobiliza‐
tion to the emerging model of the logic of connective
action in which “taking public action or contributing to
a common good becomes an act of personal expression
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and recognition or self‐validation achieved by sharing
ideas and actions in trusted relationships” (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2012, pp. 752–753).
The logic of connective action enables fragmented
populations and marginal groups that are hard to reach
by formal organizations to mobilize protest networks and
coordinate contentious activities via distributed peer‐
production. Based on the distinct logic of organization
and action formations, Bennett and Segerberg (2012)
propose a three‐part typology of large‐scale connective
action networks: self‐organizing networks, organization‐
ally enabled networks, and organizationally brokered
networks. Each ideal model involves different action
frames, communication patterns, and organizational
actors. Crosscutting all three types is the pivotal role of
digital network technologies. In this regard, social media
enriches the repertoire of popular contention through
power activation (e.g., mobilizing diverse, unequally
distributed resources among powerless and marginal
groups) and power accrual (e.g., sustaining activism over
time) in the absence of strong organizational actors
(Leong et al., 2019). This is particularly relevant to the
authoritarian polity in China, where formal organiza‐
tions and institutional establishments tend to align with
state power and government interests and cannot be
expected to serve as reliable mobilizing channels of con‐
tentious actions.
2.3. Organization and Mobilization Dynamics
Classic social movement theory places significant empha‐
sis on the role of formal organizations and clearly identi‐
fiable leadership in the mobilizing process (Tilly, 1978).
Traditionally, one of the biggest challenges for the under‐
privileged and the resource‐poor to organize collective
action has been the lack of efficient and effective means
of mobilization. This has drastically changed with the
mass diffusion of social networks as manifested via
social media. In fact, it is under the premise of person‐
alized communication via digital media networks that
the above‐mentioned logic of connective action is dif‐
ferentiated from that of conventional collective action.
As Gerbaudo (2012) shows through his research on the
Arab Spring movement, protest mobilization in the era of
social media has become horizontal, decentralized, fluid,
self‐nurturing, and instantaneous.
It however should not be taken to suggest that con‐
tention via social media no longer needs or benefits
from leadership. Rather, it means that leadership can
be enacted anonymously—unidentifiable, faceless, posi‐
tionless, and detached from any individuals. Poell et al.
(2016) insist that leadership remains important in con‐
temporary protest, both off‐ and online: “Facilitated by
social media, this mode of leadership revolves around
inviting, connecting, steering, and stimulating, rather
than directing, commanding, and proclaiming” (Poell
et al., 2016, p. 1009, emphasis in the original). Similar
dynamics have been noted in student‐led protests in
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Nigeria (Uwalaka, 2020). In the case of contentious action
in China, tactical and strategic approaches to leader‐
ship vary, from leader‐orchestrated rural protests (Li &
O’Brien, 2008) to leaderless resistance (for avoidance of
retribution; Cai, 2010) and “mobilization without masses”
(i.e., individuals taking action based on guidance by
behind‐the‐scene civil society organizations; Fu, 2018).
Social media platforms have uplifted grassroots par‐
ticipation in digital activism through their varied affor‐
dances and broad spectrum of reach to especially the
hitherto marginal and powerless groups in society (Khalil
& Storie, 2021; Leong et al., 2019; Sæbø et al., 2020). This
is particularly true in empowering popular contention in
China, where conventional media resources are highly
controlled, and interpersonal networks carry significant
weight in enacting collective action (Tai, 2018).
2.4. Social Networking via QQ Groups
QQ, an instant‐messaging service released by China’s
multinational conglomerate Tencent in 1999, allows
users to chat, email, file‐share, and engage in activi‐
ties resembling conventional online forums or bulletin‐
board systems via not only the conventional internet but
mobile phones, PDAs, and other emerging platforms as
well. A particularly popular feature is QQ Group—whose
size may vary from a few hundred to a few thousand—
which provides a venue for individuals to engage in
members‐only communicative tasks and allows users
to create tiered levels of user groups serving specific
interests, purposes, and needs of communication. As a
popular configuration of social networking communica‐
tion, QQ Group has maintained a high level of penetra‐
tion among Chinese users, encompassing user groups
ranging from chat‐focused discussion‐heavy hobbyists
to movement‐oriented activists. Typical QQ Group sizes
vary from a few dozen to a few thousand.
A competing social networking service is WeChat,
also owned by Tencent, which has evolved into a multi‐
functional super‐app for Chinese users since its debut in
2011. Even though there is substantial overlap between
WeChat and QQ in their common technical features,
each has also built its distinctive affordances catering to
different user needs. In the preliminary stage of our field
research, we asked over a dozen individuals who had
engaged in contentious activities about their modalities
of communication, and the overwhelmingly preferred
choice was QQ groups, followed remotely by WeChat.
The following affordances of QQ groups (in compari‐
son with WeChat) were driving factors: open‐endedness
(QQ accounts can be created and anonymized easily),
flexibility (QQ groups can be customized in accordance
with collective needs), archivability and navigability (it is
easy to search and store messages), and transportabil‐
ity (attachments and files can be shared conveniently
with members). In particular, it was perceived as a
formidable inhibitor for WeChat to limit one account
per user/mobile phone, whereas multiple QQ accounts
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can be set up without restrictions to fit individual needs.
Because WeChat accounts are tied to individual smart‐
phone numbers and are, therefore, easily identifiable,
it was cited as a major concern for personal privacy
and security in the context of contentious undertakings.
On the other hand, while Twitter has been the primary
platform for contentious politics in Western democra‐
cies (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Poell et al., 2016), its
Chinese counterpart Sina Weibo received no mention by
the activists we preliminarily surveyed.
3. Methods
3.1. Research Goal and Focus
The purpose of our research pertains to the use of
QQ groups as a pivotal platform in contemplating and
actualizing contention‐based collective action in China.
Following the established qualitative research practice
of aiming to understand people and things in their natu‐
ral settings (Boellstorff et al., 2012; Charmaz, 2014), our
research questions were broadly defined to interrogate
the milieu of communicative dynamics and mobilization
strategies of QQ groups in nurturing contentious action
and motivating mass participation in social protest from
initiation to goal‐setting to strategizing on‐the‐ground
actions. More specifically, our interrogations center on
this core set of questions: How do contentious QQ
groups function from member recruitment to routine
communication? How do group members reach a con‐
sensus and plan contentious activities? What is the role
of leadership, if any, in the process? What are the barri‐
ers and roadblocks to confounding collective action?
3.2. Field Sites and QQ Groups
We selected four QQ groups for this study, with each affil‐
iated with a specific cause of the protest. As revealed in
Table 1, the four types of contentious activities vary in
their respective goals with differing levels of difficulty.
Our choice of these groups was driven primarily by the
consideration that they represent the most common tra‐
jectories of popular protest outside of political pursuit
in present‐day China based on both extant research lit‐
erature (Chen, 2012; Elfstrom & Li, 2019; Li, 2019; Tai,
2018) and our personal knowledge. Participants in the
groups all hail from the southern province of Guangdong
(Canton), a leading region of Chinese civic activism.
The first group (henceforth Group A) mostly com‐
prises college faculty and staff in a relatively new area
of a metropolis called University City, with its main goal
to campaign for the rights of school‐age children to a
quality education. The construction of University City
typifies the national trends of inflated urban sprawl in
past decades in which administratively designated areas
(development zones, industrial parks, residential com‐
plexes) sprang up through government mandates. As a
result, these land‐centered “place‐making” initiatives
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Table 1. QQ Groups represented.
Year of
Origin

Group
Size

Main Issue(s)
of Contention

College
Faculty Group
(A)

February
2012

1,275

Public grade
school
construction and
zoning

Property
Buyer Group
(B)

February
2015

458

Property
Owner Group
(C)

November
2017

Environmental
Protection
Group (D)

February
2014

Group

Target(s) of
Contention

Level of
Difficulty

13

Local (district)
government

Property rights
and sales
delivery

6

232

Property rights
and post‐sale
services

388

Waste incinerator
plant blockage
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Informants

Main Participants

Major Activities

Low

Faculty and staff from
multiple institutions of
higher learning,
especially those with
school‐age children and
middle‐class residents in
the same neighborhood

Petitions and
appeals (both on‐
and offline)

Real estate
developers and local
government zoning
authorities

Medium

Property buyers under
contract with
developers and
residents who are
already in the precincts

Private and public
contests, rallies, and
protests

7

Property
management and
local government
authorities

Medium

Property owners in one
precinct that is
contracted with the
same property
management company

Appeals, petitions,
rallies, and protests

8

Government at the
municipal and local
levels

High

Residents in areas that
may be affected by the
construction of the
incinerator project

Appeals, rallies,
demonstrations,
protests, civil
disobedience, and
disorderly conduct
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have been lucrative sources for local coffers as well as
major contributors to GDP growth. However, this rapid
sprawl does not necessarily lead to urbanization because
corresponding city‐building efforts to provide essential
services to residents tend to lag behind. Against this
backdrop, this QQ group was founded to coordinate and
channel public requests to local government authori‐
ties demanding the installation of state‐of‐the‐art public‐
school facilities for families in the area.
One hallmark of China’s economic expansion has
been the skyrocketing price of real estate properties
across the country. The second QQ group (Group B)
relates to the domain of the rising tides of “home‐
owners’ activism” (Elfstrom & Li, 2019) and consists
of proprietors‐to‐be for an apartment mix under con‐
struction. Construction of the high‐rise complexes broke
ground by a well‐known national developer shortly after
it purchased land through public auction in 2014 from
the local government. By the end of 2014, construc‐
tion was started when the developer garnered a for‐
tune from deposit payments by interested buyers. Lured
by fast‐rising prices, the developer rescinded the initial
terms of sale in late 2015 and offered two alternatives to
the pre‐sale contractors: opt to get a full refund of their
initial deposit or switch to a sales term subject to the
much higher current market price. The goal of the partici‐
pants is, therefore, to petition the district government to
pressure the developer to honor its original terms of sale.
The third group (Group C) involves residents of a
new urban neighborhood fighting with contracted prop‐
erty management for routine service and maintenance.
Normally, residential areas are in the care of property
management companies based on a monthly fee through
a service contract. But disputes may occur when contrac‐
tual terms are breached, resulting in sloppy or dimin‐
ished services to the neighborhood. At the time of our
research in 2017 and 2018, members of this group had
been engaged in a protracted contestation to seek reso‐
lutions by appealing to the property management com‐
pany and the district government (which has oversight
over administrative responsibilities).
The fourth group (Group D) features the largest num‐
ber of dissenting individuals as well as the utmost level
of challenge. Its goal is to stop the local government’s
effort to build a solid waste incinerator in its vicinity. This
contention group is also the longest in duration among
all four groups, having continued from 2010 through the
whole process of our research. This group fits in with the
overall trend of rising waves of environmental contesta‐
tion in China in recent years, especially the mass move‐
ment in opposition to incinerators. This QQ group was
one of many organizing and coordinating protest‐related
actions in the area.
3.3. Data Collection
We utilized a combination of methodological approaches
and data sources in this research. Virtual ethnography
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is a useful approach to disentangle immersive details
and rich contexts of online interactions (Boellstorff et al.,
2012). The ethnographic component of the research—
which lasted from early 2014 to late 2018—consists of
observing group discussions and interactions as a regu‐
lar member in all four groups and occasionally participat‐
ing in offline group events such as discussion sessions,
rallies, and protests. As highlighted by Kozinets (2015),
engagement and participation in social life are essen‐
tial for researchers to feel the pulse of the frontlines of
field research.
We collected a variety of data, including archival data
of QQ group communications, notes of on‐site protests
and other activities, and, most importantly, interviews of
QQ group members. The main data corpus that informs
our analysis comes from semi‐structured interviews of
the 34 (20 female vs. 14 male) members of the QQ
groups (see Table 1). Among the interviewees, 12 were
QQ group administrators (core activists, four in Group A,
two in Group B, and three each in Groups C and D), and
22 were general participants (periphery followers). Being
an active member of these groups offered us the advan‐
tage in recruiting research participants, and we complied
with the standard procedure of social research in obtain‐
ing informed consent from individuals for participating in
the interviews. Considering the highly sensitive nature of
the topics and activities these groups stand for, we took
extra precautions to assure the anonymity of both the
participants and the data. Individuals who agreed to par‐
ticipate were asked to choose to complete the interview
via QQ text or audio chatting at a time most convenient
to their schedule. Each participant was asked similar
but not exactly identical questions, often with follow‐up
prompts where necessary. The interviews were com‐
pleted from mid‐2015 to late 2018. All text‐based inter‐
views were saved, and audio chats were recorded and
transcribed for further analysis.
3.4. Data Analysis
We followed the three phases of analyzing the inter‐
views: data reduction, data reorganization, and data rep‐
resentation (Roulston, 2014). The analytical procedure is
guided by the synthesized strategies as recommended
by Charmaz (2014, p. 115) in grounded theory coding
of interview data as an effort to “understand partici‐
pants’ views and actions from their perspectives.” Our
initial coding (open coding) for the purpose of data
reduction was conducted with a subsection of the inter‐
view data to extract meanings and interpretations into
major emerging categories. In our data reorganization
phase (focused coding), we applied and modified the
previous coding scheme by traversing through the com‐
plete data corpus. Once the data coding was concluded,
we followed the logic and logistics of axial coding in
integrating the data in order “to find coherence to the
emerging analysis” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 147). While cod‐
ing data into categories, we also made an effort to “read
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holistically and holonically for a hermeneutic interpreta‐
tion” (Kozinets, 2015, p. 215) of the synthesized narra‐
tives from each interviewee.
In ascertaining dominant and recurring themes and
clusters of meaning, we were primarily inspired by the
conceptual and procedural approach as mapped out by
Braun and Clarke (2021). We extracted thematic threads
and integrated them into coherent narrative lines in rela‐
tion to our core research questions.
4. Findings
4.1. Gatekeeping, Identity Building, and Monitoring
Throughout the process of observation, participation,
and interaction with group members, we noted salient
niceties in the management of memberships and the
day‐to‐day operation of group activities in the context
of their missions and stated goals. Norms, expectations,
and routine patterns of interactions among members
point to the unique collective identity and psyche of each
group. This all starts with the initiation of group mem‐
berships. Across all four groups, a common thread we
noted is that group administrators are very circumspect
in admitting new members and monitoring any poten‐
tial flags that may disrupt or derail the predefined mis‐
sion of group activities. Group administrators and core
members worked diligently to reach out to a large base
of individuals who were likely participants of collective
action. Groups were advertised publicly through posters
in prominent venues, and interpersonal networks were
mobilized for recruiting. Activists in Groups A, B, and C
even adopted a carpet recruiting strategy by going door‐
to‐door to persuade individuals to join. However, not
everyone who submitted a request was admitted to the
QQ groups, as a high level of caution was exercised in
admitting members. Each request was given a careful
background check in terms of relevance, motivation to
engage, and clear interest in participating. Because each
group was formed with a set goal of contention, admis‐
sion to a group was preconditioned on proof of identity
and residence so that these individuals could be veritable
targets of collective action.
Each QQ group is managed by about a dozen of
administrators, who play the role of gatekeepers and
moderators in overseeing its day‐to‐day flow of commu‐
nication. In order to maintain cohesion, groups enforce
a strict policy of restricting the scope of communica‐
tion to topics highly related to the issues of contention.
We tracked the streams of messages for a few selec‐
tive months in each group from 2015 to 2018 and found
that 80% to 85% of the threads were closely focused on
the chosen issues at hand. From time to time, a small
number of individuals may send out commercial spam
or messages totally unrelated to designated group activ‐
ities, to which group administrators and other members
will issue warnings. Repeated offenders risk having their
membership terminated. At the same time, messages
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deemed to have the potential to demoralize or derail
group activities are typically deflated or debunked by fel‐
low members. Indeed, over the duration of our research,
we observed a number of individuals being kicked out of
these QQ groups for distributing commercial messages,
being uninterested in group actions, having anti‐group
interests, or being suspected of spying.
In the process of gaining membership and recruiting
interviewees in the QQ groups, we noticed an unmis‐
takable pattern of an increasing level of excruciating
scrutiny commensurate with the degree of difficulty
and sensitivity corresponding to the type of contentious
action each group hinges upon. Entry to Group A met
with the lowest hurdle, while membership in Groups B
and C had to be obtained through recommendation and
assurance of other group members to group administra‐
tors. Joining Group D was the most tortuous, facilitated
by the researcher’s active participation in offline protest
activities on numerous occasions.
Participants from Group A were the most receptive to
interview solicitations, while those in Group D were the
most uncooperative. As a matter of fact, the researcher
who conducted the bulk of the interviews was discontin‐
ued from Groups B and D by group administrators upon
receiving complaints from members who were being con‐
tacted for possible interviews. Confirmation of no evil
intention and verification of credentials on the part of
the researcher by multiple good‐standing members in
the respective groups helped the researcher to reen‐
ter these groups. Similarly, the researcher’s participa‐
tion in numerous on‐site protests facilitated the inter‐
view process, as a number of interviewees requested
proof of presence in field protests prior to agreeing to
be interviewed.
4.2. The Power of Soft Information
Like most other communal practices, QQ groups culti‐
vate a collective sense of “shared awareness,” which is
defined by Shirky (2008, pp. 35–36) as “the ability of each
member of a group to not only understand the situation
at hand but also understand that everyone else does,
too.” This shared awareness starts with, but extends
beyond, simply informational sharing. The majority of
the interviewees confirmed the usefulness of and their
dependence on these QQ groups for obtaining infor‐
mation in relation to the group‐specific points of focus.
The sentiment is best echoed by an interviewee from
Group D, who was amazed to learn from the group that
“other people feel the same way as I do” against building
the waste incinerator in the vicinity.
Although it is often possible for members to obtain
similar information from other sources, the content res‐
onates better with the individuals when it comes (even
if it may be a repost from elsewhere) from one of their
own. Additionally, there is also a sizable chunk of infor‐
mation that is only available from the group, such as
insiders’ backdoor updates (many members have friends
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or acquaintances in local government branches who
often share first‐hand information from within the gov‐
ernment) and what has worked and what has not in sim‐
ilar campaigns in other places. Reposted information is
often annotated and made relevant to the situation at
hand, adding a personal touch and customized appeal.
Some information is actionable, as illustrated by the cir‐
culation of tips in Group D on which specific government
officials (with decision power) to appeal to, and the shar‐
ing of personnel profiles in Groups B and C with explana‐
tions on whom to target in making complaints.
4.3. Group Psyche, Emotional Contagion, and the
Egalitarian Spirit
QQ groups provide a viable venue for collective support
under varied circumstances. In specific relevance to con‐
tentious action, group affiliation conduces to the devel‐
opment and maintenance of close emotional relation‐
ships. We found two persistent thematic lines among the
interviewees: When things go well, QQ groups become
a platform for members to send out self‐congratulatory,
uplifting, and sometimes electrifying rally calls in mov‐
ing forward; at times of hiccups and setbacks, quite a
few members indicate that QQ groups help them “just
let it out,” stay upbeat, and work out ways to fight
on. A Chinese idiom that has been mentioned multiple
times is that, under circumstances of hardship, being in
the same group strengthens the sense of camaraderie
and allows members to “huddle together for warmth”
(抱团取暖). This is aptly summarized by one member
in Group D, who was surprised that “many people [in
the group] share my anger and frustration over the
incinerator plan. Chatting with them gives me the emo‐
tional release with like‐minded individuals.” On the pos‐
itive end, a participant from Group C said that battling
together “builds a connection that runs deeper than just
among neighbors. It gratifies me that I have these people
living next door.”
Interaction within groups and participation in collec‐
tive activities also have the spillover effects of strength‐
ening interpersonal relatedness and group cohesion.
As people get to know one another on a more inti‐
mate level, the relationships among many may naturally
evolve from weak ties to close connections. Quite a few
interviewees mentioned that they developed long‐term
relations and congenial friendships with QQ group mem‐
bers through weekend excursions, family trips, and
other socializing events that are not directly related
to contentious missions. As one informant in Group B
remarked: “As someone who recently relocated, the QQ
group gives me a great opportunity to be friends with
like‐minded people in the neighborhood.”
The culture of QQ groups thrives on an egalitarian
spirit that encourages peer‐to‐peer, open, and demo‐
cratic participation. Interviewees expressed very few
concerns or qualms about contributing to the discus‐
sions if they so choose. The fact that QQ allows users
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to anonymize their identity eases individual participation
because they do not have to worry how friends or col‐
leagues may judge them based on brazen expressions of
opinions or suggestions. As it pans out, participation in
collective action, especially when it involves contention
with powerful corporate or state interests, works best on
the principle of voluntariness rather than coercion. There
is also a noticeable spillover or contagious effect across
the groups in terms of the spirit of activism because mul‐
tiple individuals, who did not seem to be heavily involved
in most other aspects of group activities, said that the
dedication and passion they sensed from fellow activists
precipitated their participation.
However, this egalitarian spirit hinges on the pre‐
sumption that there is a willingness to act, which is the
primary goal of each group. Individuals are allowed to
debate what they think are the best tactics of action,
but any speeches that may disrupt the group goal of
taking action meet with decisive resistance from most
members. Dissenters are often spiraled into silence by
the will of the majority, a trend that is well noted by
this activist in Group D: “Whenever there is voice ques‐
tioning the need to take action, or the tendency to sink
group morale, it will mostly meet with denunciation by
the majority. After a few occurrences, dissenting voice is
completely silenced in group conversations.”
4.4. Action‐Centered and Activist‐Brokered Networks
The ultimate benchmark of success for each QQ group
is to mobilize members into collective action in order
to achieve their respective goals. A common thread we
have noted is that there are meticulously coordinated
activities in planning for events and mobilizing partici‐
pation. Because residents moving to these newly estab‐
lished residential districts hail from diverse backgrounds
and origins, this poses a major barrier to organizing and
mobilizing for action. This leads multiple interviewees to
conclude that “none of the protests would have been
possible without this QQ group.” One interviewee from
Group B said that “the QQ group has been extremely
helpful [in reaching our goals]. Without it, I would have
lost my apartment [under contract].”
Events and activities all four groups organize include
written and online appeals, petitions to the local office
of the Bureau for Letters and Calls (the official body
in charge of public complaints), attending public hear‐
ings, engaging online and conventional media platforms,
writing letters to local representatives and government
officials, and collective strolling (as a special form of
protest). Groups B, C, and D are also successful in stag‐
ing protests in public venues, something that Group A
planned to do but suspended when the major goal of
the campaign succeeded prior to the need for public con‐
frontation. Groups B and C also organized appeals and
complaints to the government inspection squad from the
higher authority. In particular, Group D also succeeded
in organizing a few highly publicized road blockages in
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protest of the local government’s effort to construct a
waste incinerator in the vicinity. As is the typical strategy
with public protest, the whole event was videotaped via
smartphones by designated members, and photos were
posted via multiple platforms of social media in real time.
Local media were also notified ahead of the protest.
QQ groups are used as a viable venue for contemplat‐
ing and debating the details of tactics. Individual mem‐
bers would draft petition letters, share them with the
group, offer advice on what to say at public hearings,
what legal recourse they had (in the case of Groups B and
C), how to contact local government agencies in sending
their feedback, where to go online, and what to say to
magnify their voice. Meticulous details were worked out
and shared with the group as to how to act at each step.
Resource mobilization has been an important (and
oftentimes make‐or‐break) factor in shaping collec‐
tive action. Besides human and information resources,
QQ groups also function as an effective platform for
fund‐raising in support of group contentious activities.
All these groups except Group A engage vigorously in
soliciting and organizing donations from both in‐group
and out‐group sources. There is a transparent process
for sharing information about money flows and expendi‐
tures, which helps in subsequent gifting. Of special note
is Group D, which raised over one million Chinse yuan
(approximately 158 K US dollars) from 2014 to 2017 to
support event planning of public protest.
Although there is no institutional organization
involved, tactical organization by a core group of activists
is essential in making group action possible through
painstaking preplanning. Core activists function as lead‐
ers and largely stay invisible to the larger group, in effect‐
ing a core‐periphery (leader‐follower) organizational
structure to stage large‐scale group protests and con‐
tentious activities. The core set of activists played a piv‐
otal role in initiating each QQ group through aggressive
recruiting, and they take care of the day‐to‐day admin‐
istration of the QQ group in spearheading discussion
and streamlining participation. Core activists set up ded‐
icated channels (typically on WeChat and QQ) among
themselves and often spend time together in person
to contemplate, debate, and strategize. They are also
essential in chartering every detail such as duration,
route, and slogans to guide group members in staging
public protests. Yet, they carefully choreograph online
and offline activities by staying behind the scenes and
avoiding publicity, mostly to avoid becoming potential
targets of retribution and prosecution, as the possibility
of an official crackdown cannot be dismissed.
4.5. The Cat‐and‐Mouse Game
Initially, all QQ groups functioned as platforms for dis‐
tributing scheduled collective action events beforehand
so as to maximize participation. It was quickly found
out that information about planned protests was often
leaked to the real estate developer (Group B), the

Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 4, Pages 66–76

property management (Group C), and the local police
(Groups C and D) ahead of time, and carefully premed‐
itated contentious action was thus foiled on a few occa‐
sions. Therefore, group members came to the discovery
that spies for the realty developer (Group B) and prop‐
erty management (Group C) infiltrated the QQ groups,
and either a government informant(s) was present or
group discussions became a target of surveillance by
the local police for Group D. In response, the groups
changed their organizing tactics, and limited online dis‐
cussions in the group to the announcement of forthcom‐
ing protest events without releasing the exact venue or
date. Instead, a core set of leaders would work out the
tactical details among themselves through their sepa‐
rate channels and then communicate these to individual
activists who would subsequently resort to interpersonal
networks (offline, via smartphones, or alternative chan‐
nels of communication) to mobilize members for partic‐
ipation merely hours ahead of the planned protest on
the same day. Multiple interviewees who played lead‐
ing roles revealed to us that they relied on alternative
channels (via separate QQ groups or WeChat groups)
to discuss logistics and sensitive topics and worked out
sophisticated plans on what to communicate to the
larger group. This multi‐tiered strategy seems to have
worked smoothly for subsequent protest activities, as
confirmed by our interviewees. QQ group space became
an effective venue to circulate protest‐related post hoc
announcements in order to pep up group morale.
By contrast, Group A did not experience any disrup‐
tive intervention from its primary target of appeal (i.e.,
district government), most likely due to the much less
sensitive nature of their demands, and members rarely
resorted to public protests in addressing their grievances.
Building a good school district is not substantively out
of tune with the overall goal of the local authorities,
even though disagreements often exist on how that may
be accomplished.
4.6. Boundary‐Setting
Most members in these groups are unequivocally cau‐
tious in defining the boundaries of their intended con‐
tention and stay away from proscribed territories (e.g.,
incendiary speech and anti‐government rhetoric). Group
administrators actively delete member‐contributed
posts that fall within the taboo category, and discus‐
sions that are deemed out of the line are immedi‐
ately terminated. All groups cite excessively govern‐
ment documents and policies in support of their causes.
Members in Group C even went to the length of quoting
from President Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th Chinese
Communist Party Congress as proof that what they
were requesting is within the parameters of Xi’s nation‐
building grand goal. In a couple of protests, slogans that
did not match the collective cause or were out of line
were confiscated by other members. This strategy of
self‐limiting protests and contention to their narrowly
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tailored goals was mentioned repeatedly by interviewees
as an effective way to fend off government retaliation.
4.7. Barriers and Inhibitors
We asked the interviewees what they perceived as the
barriers and drawbacks in organizing contentious action
via QQ groups. The issue receiving the most complaints is
one that has persistently challenged organizers of collec‐
tive action—the presence of free riders across all groups
(Tilly, 1978). Interestingly, the presence of free riders cor‐
relates to the level of difficulty in the goals of the groups’
contention. Participation in group discussion and con‐
tentious action is the most widespread in Group A and is
the most uneven in Group D. In other words, the largest
number of free riders exists in Group D, as corroborated
by both our observation and the interviewee testimoni‐
als. One frustration that most activists in Group D shared
with us is the number of “bystanders” in the group.
Because QQ users can easily register using pseudo‐
names, that poses challenges to organizers of collective
action on two fronts: first, it is hard to verify member
identities at the time of admittance to a group; second,
the veil of virtual identity makes it easier for certain mem‐
bers to stay inactive and refrain from participating. This
harks back to the previously mentioned suspicion by mul‐
tiple interviewees that the groups have been infiltrated
by business and government informants. Another issue
that upsets many interviewees is the perceived ubiquity
of state surveillance over what happens in group discus‐
sions, and that serves as a potential deterrent for some
individuals to fully engage in online chatting. Lastly, it was
mentioned earlier that positive spillover may occur when
members go upbeat and exhibit optimism. The reverse
can be true as well, as some interviewees point out: con‐
tagion is a double‐edged sword because, during times of
setbacks or non‐progress, pessimistic feelings from some
members could dissipate quickly to others in the group,
thus demobilizing individual incentives for participating
in later events.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Breakneck economic development in the reform era in
the past four decades has disentangled social, economic,
and political relations in China and has turned the coun‐
try into a hotbed of collective action. Staging public
protests has become an effective way for disassociated
individuals and organized groups across social sectors
and geographic regions to lodge complaints and gain
leverage when negotiating with state agents and power‐
ful interest groups.
The surge of contentious activities has paralleled
the explosive growth of social media use within China.
As shown in the findings of our research with QQ groups,
the popularization of social media tools and platforms
has reenergized and redefined the landscape of con‐
tentious action.
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The four QQ groups we studied here all originated
from interest‐based connections hailing from the same
geographic areas and established their online presence
as a platform for contemplating and mobilizing con‐
tentious activities. Three groups (Groups A, B, and C) per‐
tain to the rising waves of “rightful protest” (grievances
derived from claimants’ unfulfilled rights; O’Brien, 2013),
and one group (Group D) falls in the popular domain
of environmental activism (Tai, 2018). The interconnec‐
tion between these QQ groups activates and revitalizes
latent communal ties related to the common pursuit
of contentious goals. Interaction in these goal‐oriented
QQ groups has introduced new dynamics and vitality to
everyday resistance and popular contention. As a spe‐
cial technology‐enabled social space, these QQ groups
all thrive on the practice of sharing—not merely informa‐
tional sharing, but rather a collective sense of “shared
awareness” (Shirky, 2008) that induces a regularized
“everyday resistance” (Scott, 1990) among members.
What permeates the QQ zone extends beyond hard
information; rather, it delivers a type of “soft informa‐
tion” with customized touches and tailored angles that
resonate well with targeted individuals. Although many
of the messages circulated in the groups may also be
found elsewhere, they come with annotated interpre‐
tations made relevant to the very specific undertaking
of these groups. There is also information that is only
available to these respective groups, mostly backchannel
updates and action‐oriented tactical messages. All these
messages carry special appeals among group members,
because fellow members who distribute the messages
necessarily have endorsed them.
Herding, which is “the alignment of thoughts or
behaviours of individuals in a group (herd) through
local interactions rather than centralized coordination”
(Raafat et al., 2009, p. 420), has been a well‐documented
feature of human behavior under various circumstances.
We have noted evidence pointing to varying degrees of
the “ripple effect” (Barsade, 2002) in which the urge to
act transfers among members of the QQ groups. Being
exposed to contentious speech may cultivate a particular
mentality, a lifestyle, or an attitude that spurs individuals
to act in protests, as echoed in the concept of “speech
cascade,” which contends that “public understanding
of what constitutes impermissible speech may change
abruptly, sparking bandwagons of uncensored speech”
(Druzin & Li, 2016, p. 369). Likewise, spontaneous erup‐
tion of mass protests may also collapse regime control
from time to time, as amply evidenced in waves of mass
incidents across regions in China in recent years. As our
findings demonstrate, the virtual space of QQ groups pro‐
vides a vital venue for individuals to sustain contempla‐
tion, coordination, and engagement in collective action.
The primary motivation for individuals to join in con‐
tentious action is interest‐driven. However, the process
of participating in group discussions typically leads to
awakened rights consciousness and policy awareness
among individuals, whereas contentious action breeds
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“protest opportunism” (Chen, 2012) that exerts respon‐
siveness to collective grievances from government and
corporate authorities. Even though the protests we
examined fit loosely with the “organizing without orga‐
nization” prototype (Shirky, 2008), this by no means
downplays the pivotal need for preemptive, painstaking
down‐to‐earth organizing. Voluntary leadership by core
activists plays an indispensable role in initiating and coor‐
dinating member participation and bringing collective
action to fruition. In their important article on connec‐
tive action, Bennett and Segerberg (2012) pinpoint three
ideal types of organizational networks: self‐organizing
networks, organizationally enabled networks, and orga‐
nizationally brokered networks. Our findings, however,
identified a fourth type—activist‐brokered networks in
which core leadership from self‐organizing individuals
enacts periphery involvement and participation in con‐
tentious actions. Even though these leading individu‐
als lack formal organizational affiliation, their broker‐
age is essential to connect disparate individuals and
build strong coordination of collective action. This
hybrid model of connective action crosscuts Bennett
and Segerberg’s (2012, p. 756) self‐organizing networks
and organizationally brokered networks and points to
a viable roadmap toward mobilizing participation in
collective contention in the era of personalized social
networks, especially under the conditions of a rela‐
tively closed (controlled) communication environment.
The threat of a repressive regime may be a deterrent
for easily identifiable leaders of contentious politics, and
this type of network structure mitigates potential risk
of retribution by government authorities towards indi‐
vidual activists. Likewise, member‐only communication
in QQ groups creates a buffer against government cen‐
sors and activates the contentious spirit of participants
at the periphery.
QQ Zone provides a robust venue for collective dis‐
cussion, deliberation, and mobilization. But social media
can act as a double‐edged sword, as shown by the per‐
vasive presence of surveillance and infiltration by the
government and powerful commercial entities in these
QQ groups. Group leaders, who mostly hide their identi‐
ties behind the virtual veil, have adopted a multi‐layered
mechanism of group mobilization: utilizing more secure
platforms for strategizing protest among core activists,
resorting to QQ groups for spreading the spirit of con‐
tention and pro‐action, and relying on conventional inter‐
personal networks in mobilizing participation. Moreover,
self‐limiting the scope of collective protest through fram‐
ing group demands seems to be an important consensual
understanding in sustaining contentious causes.
Finally, we acknowledge the limitations of this
research in that data were only gathered from four QQ
groups. Findings cannot, therefore, be interpreted as
representing the evolving terrains and diverse scope of
popular contention in China. One important omission in
our research is the domain of political protest and ide‐
ologically charged movements. Even though we noted
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the multi‐tiered nature of communication among par‐
ticipating individuals, our research was confined to four
specifically situated QQ groups, and we were not able to
cover the complete networks of communication activists
used in our data collection and analysis. Future research
should expand to the investigation of multi‐platform inte‐
gration in the mobilization of contentious action.
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